Israeli Initiative

7^th draft – June 2024

Authors

• Prof. Jonathan Dekel-Chen, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• Lt. Colonel (Ret.) Mordechai Kedar, PhD
• Etai Dekel-Chen

Executive Summary

Now, in the ninth month of Operation “Iron Swords,” all of Israel’s stated military objectives and a permanent cease-fire can be achieved through a large-scale exile of a large number of the remaining Hamas, and other terrorist, forces remaining in the Gaza Strip.[1]

In recent months we have presented and discussed the proposal with the most senior military officials, members of Israel’s security community, as well as leading politicians and scholars in Israel.  We have also presented this Initiative and its Executive Summary to US officials directly connected to the hostage crisis and negotiation process; all of these decision-makers agree that it bears much potential. To the best of our knowledge, none of them have yet raised it for discussion in the negotiation process between Israel and Hamas. Our ongoing meetings with prominent government, security officials and scholars in Israel suggest that this proposal can be agreed upon by the majority of the Israeli public and, consequently, also by the Israeli government.[2] 

This initiative takes a holistic approach to end the conflict and return of the 120 hostages (living and murdered) held by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. No less important, the initiative proposes the contours of post-Hamas Gaza. We base our plan for post-Hamas Gaza upon the painful historical conclusion that both Israel and the United States have failed in the past in their attempts at democratic state-building in Arab countries using western models. The plan lays out a positive future for the people of Gaza, free of Hamas and with the resources to rebuild secure and stable communities.

Current Conditions

To date, the Israeli government has not presented a plan for ending the war that addresses the “day after” for the population of post-Hamas Gaza.  Israel has only dealt with partial deals; it has not presented a viable option for the return of all the hostages. This Initiative aims to remedy this vacuum of workable ideas.

Hamas no longer governs the vast majority of the Gaza Strip. As a result of the current war, its leadership is isolated in small pockets in the central and southern areas of Gaza. The IDF has significantly depleted its membership. Large parts of Gaza are now in chaos. That being said, Hamas is patient; its leaders still believe that time works in their favor.  Hamas has prepared itself for war. By various means it still possesses sufficient supplies of food, fuel, water, ammunition, manpower and international support.  Hamas also holds 120 hostages, who they use as human shields and as an “insurance policy” for its leaders. As admitted by Yehya Sinwar, and documented by the Wall Street Journal earlier this month, Sinwar also counts the people of Gaza as human shields for Hamas members, thereby directly endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians.

The Biden Administration has supported Israel’s war effort against Hamas but does not understand Israel’s war aims. As a result, the Administration limits Israel’s freedom of action to apply maximal military or humanitarian pressure on Hamas.

Qatar’s leaders appear comfortable with the current state of affairs.  It is not under significant pressure from Washington and, therefore, does not apply maximal pressure on Hamas to reach a deal with Israel that will free the hostages. 

The current war has increased pressure on Egypt, which fears a potential exodus of refugees from Gaza as well as a looming economic crisis arising from the closing of the Suez Canal by Houthi rebels in Yemen firing at civilian shipping in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The current war also threatens domestic unrest from the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Palestinian Egyptians. 

Those hostages who are still alive face grave danger, held in ever-worsening conditions and vulnerable to IDF attacks on Hamas targets.  Israel’s best efforts to rescue them through military action have failed – barring three rescue missions that freed a total of hostages held by Hamas above ground. 

Our proposal does not contradict, override or reject interim partial deals for the release of hostages or increases in humanitarian aid. 

The Israeli Initiative: Description

All of Israel’s war objectives (ending Hamas’ rule in Gaza, return of all hostages, restoring security in Israel’s South, rebuilding Israel’s deterrence) can be achieved through a mass exile of all (or the great majority of) remaining Hamas and other terrorist forces.  This can happen only by forming a unified Israeli front, fully coordinated with the US, Qatar, and Egypt. This unified front will facilitate maximum military, diplomatic and civilian pressure on Hamas.

Hamas’s Objectives:

1. The destruction of Israel, even if this now might seem a distant possibility.
2. Full governance in Gaza and, eventually, the West Bank. This simultaneously will serve to enhance Hamas’s efforts to destroy Israel. 
3. Releasing Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. This will facilitate the first two objectives.
4. Fragmentation of Israeli society, which will also facilitate Hamas’s first three objectives.

Each objective has its own importance for Hamas; each will count as a victory for Hamas in this war.  The Israeli hostages held by Hamas serve a direct role in reaching the last two objectives, while also supporting the first two goals. The hostages provide leverage for the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The hostage crisis has increased tensions in Israeli society.  Therefore, Hamas has a vested interest in holding the hostages for as long as possible.

Starting with Hamas’s massacre on October 7, 2023 of more than 1200 Israelis alongside its kidnapping of 240 others, Yehya Sinwar could have ended the bloodshed and suffering of millions of Palestinians in Gaza by releasing all the Israeli hostages. Now, nearly nine months into this war, only an Israeli initiative, supported by a broad, multi-nation coalition, can bring the release of all hostages and end the war.

Israel’s Political Landscape

To reach an agreement with Hamas while retaining broad public support in Israel, this proposal respects the “red lines” of major political actors in Israel. At the same time, the proposal demands concessions from each of them. 

To the best of our understanding, the Israeli Right wing will not settle for less than full Israeli security control over the Gaza Strip. It will not agree to deals that include a mass release of convicted terrorists into the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or their release into “Green Line” Israel.[3] The Israeli Right, however, will agree to postpone pursuit of Hamas leaders until after the release of the hostages. To obtain the release of the hostages, the Israel Right will also agree to not renew Jewish settlement activities in Gaza. 

The Israeli Center and Left wings will not settle for anything less than full release of all the hostages.  They will, however, accept full Israeli security control over the Gaza strip and will be prepared to postpone the two-state solution until a worthy, deradicalized Palestinian leadership emerges. 

Given the above, we propose the exile of Hamas leaders and their families, along with all remaining militants and factions to a host country(ies), while minimizing the release of convicted terrorists and maintaining Israeli security control over Gaza. 

The Plan, by Stages

1. After securing Israel’s agreement, together with agreement with the US and synchronization with Egypt and Qatar, the proposal is presented to Hamas either directly or through a third party. 
2. Israel intensifies military operations and clarifies that this plan is the only way for Hamas to survive the war. 
3. Cease Fire
4. Once Hamas accepts this plan – including the exile of all remaining Hamas forces – Israel holds fire and releases Palestinian prisoners (exact numbers to be determined through negotiations before the plan is implemented). 
5. Israel repositions to defensive lines inside Gaza, according to the security needs defined by the IDF. These lines are not negotiable by Hamas and will include a deep demilitarized kill-zone on the border between Israel and Gaza.
6. Israel retains full control of the border between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphi Corridor). This step is crucial to ensure full demilitarization and disarmament of the Gaza Strip. Since Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Egypt has proven incapable of stopping the flow of weapons and other militarized resources flowing through, and under, its border with Gaza.
7. Israel retains “‘operational freedom” to neutralize all security threats in, and emanating from, Gaza.  
8. All of the hostages – civilians, soldiers, men, women, children, living and deceased – are released within a maximum of 24 hours from implementation of the plan. The hostages are transferred to Israel by the Red Cross or directly to Israel through Egypt.  None of the remaining 120 hostages is left behind. 
9. Hamas goes into exile to a pre-arranged host country(ies). All Hamas leaders and all personnel exit the Gaza Strip.  They are allowed to take their personal firearms, flags and nuclear families.  All Islamic Jihad members and other terrorist factions exit Gaza.  Israel publishes a list of every person that cannot remain in Gaza after the exile. Anyone on that list remaining in Gaza thereafter will be considered in violation of the agreement and neutralized by Israel. 
10. Countries with diplomatic ties to Israel who agree to host these exiles from Gaza will receive a commitment from Israel that it will not pursue on their lands exiled members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, on condition that the exiles do not reengage in terrorist activities. 
11. Once the exile is complete, Gaza is split into self-administrating provinces. Civilian responsibility in Gaza is given to disarmed local entities, mutually agreed upon by Israel and the US (and possibly Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia). These provinces will be joined into a Confederation system.[4]
12. The Palestinian Authority plays no role in post-Hamas Gaza. UNRWA’s role is reduced to humanitarian aid and will gradually dissolve once the provinces improve their governing and managerial capacities. 
13. Israel retains sole responsibility for security in the Gaza strip and ensures that no armed force rises without its consent. 
14. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza is conditional and dependent on full disarmament. 
15. Each province in the Confederation will manage its own reconstruction and rehabilitation. The means of construction and training of local administration and police forces will be determined through negotiations. The countries supporting and funding the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza (potentially Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Turkey, Bahrain, Egypt and others) will commit in advance to withdrawing their support if Hamas or any other armed group gains control of local governments, policing, or education systems.